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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I will argue that philosophers have overestimated the
value of reflective endorsement. Introspection does not, as many philosophers have supposed, shine a searchlight on a person’s authentic
identity. Our “selves” are not as transparent to us as we would like to
think. I will argue that if this is the case, the outputs of the reflective
endorsement process are not inherently normative in the way that
thinkers like Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard have suggested. If this is the case, then the identities that we establish through the
process of reflective endorsement are not the moral features of our
experience that we might have supposed. And if this is the case, then
we would be wrong to place other-than-human animals in a different
moral category than humans simply because they do not regularly
engage in reflective endorsement. I will argue that we learn more
about our authentic selves by monitoring our consistent, reliable dispositions to behave. If this is the case, there would no longer be any
justification for denying that other-than-human animals have coherent identities through time, since they too demonstrate reliable and
predictable behavioral dispositions.
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In Plato’s dialogues, much is made of the Delphic maxim
“Know Thyself.” In contemporary individualist cultures,
knowing oneself has become a significant profit industry. A
person who wants to know more about why they behave in the
way that they do might pay for psychotherapy. A quick library
database search reveals a seemingly endless list of self-help
books that claim to help the potential reader to “discover” or to
“rediscover” herself.
Indeed, for many, knowledge of the self seems to be an important component for living a meaningful life. One’s sense of
self is important for one’s self esteem. It often involves identification with a set of values and principles that one finds important. In recent years, a number of philosophical writers have
cast the self, discovered upon introspection, in critical roles in
their philosophical theories. For example, Christine Korsgaard
views the ways in which we identify as the source of the binding nature of our reasons, both moral and practical (Korsgaard
1996). Harry Frankfurt attaches our sense of identity to what
we care about and to what it is to be a person (Frankfurt 2004).
Much discussion of the value of understanding the self puts
significant emphasis on what a person finds upon introspection—one identifies with one’s own values through a process
of reflective endorsement. There may be some value in this
internal process. On the other hand, if we identify this way of
knowing oneself with what it is to be a person, what it is for
things to be valuable, and what it is that makes a thing a reason
for a being, it might be easy to conclude that beings that don’t
have the capacities that humans do for introspection do not live
valuable, meaningful lives.
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In this paper, I will argue that, though there is some philosophical value in introspection, it is not as useful as we tend to
think. I will argue that we are not as transparent to ourselves as
we imagine, and that much of what we find upon introspection
is really just confabulation. I will contend further that a more
authentic picture of the self should focus not on what one finds
upon introspection, but on dispositions to behave. Though some
non-human animals may not have the capacity for introspection
that humans do, they certainly do have behavioral dispositions.

Reflective Endorsement, Human Identity, and
Human Reasons
As Peter Singer points out in Animal Liberation, philosophers often provide solutions to philosophical problems that attempt to solve those problems as human beings encounter them
(Singer 1975). The necessary and sufficient conditions for many
philosophical concepts tend to be drawn up in ways that render facts about non-human animals and the experiences of such
animals irrelevant to the conversation.1 Singer points out that
this description has historically been accurate when it comes
to philosophical discussion of the problem of inequality. I contend that we also lack justification for leaving facts about nonhuman animals out of the conversation when it comes to many
other philosophical concepts. Most relevant to the discussion
here will be philosophical concepts such as knowledge, reasons
for action, personhood, and the self. I’ll provide two examples
of contemporary philosophical frameworks that encourage us
(intentionally or not) to think about important philosophical
questions from a decidedly human lens.

I’m thinking, for example, of the distinction between animal and reflective knowledge in Ernest Sosa’s A Virtue Epistemology. (Sosa 2007)
1
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Before I do so, however, I want to quickly sketch a fairly
common picture of the behavior of persons. Consider the activity of Jane. Throughout her life, Jane forms beliefs on the
basis of quality evidence. She is able to do this because she has
given careful thought to the question of exactly what counts as
evidence and has made a conscious effort to make sure that her
beliefs are evidence responsive. Jane has established a set of
values. Those values do much work in defining who she is as
a person. When she encounters a moral dilemma, she does her
best to make sure that her actions are consistent with her values. In this way, Jane endeavors to follow the maxim “Know
Thyself” and to live an examined life. Notice that throughout, Jane repeatedly consults her own mental states and takes
attitudes toward her own thoughts. Let’s keep Jane in mind
throughout the discussion here.
Turning to contemporary philosophy, let’s look first to the
work of Christine Korsgaard. In The Sources of Normativity,
Korsgaard attempts to answer what she calls The Normative
Question. For any normative claim ever made, for any justification for action ever offered, it is always possible to ask, “Why
should I care about that?” When I make a practical decision,
The Normative Question arises. I might decide to spend my
free time learning a new language so that I can understand
more about people and the world. But it’s always possible for
me to ask myself, “Why should I care about that?” When I
make an ethical decision, The Normative Question again arises. I might decide to donate money to educate women and girls
in developing nations. Again, I can always ask myself, “Why
should I care about that?” The Normative Question concerns
the fundamental justification for normativity, both moral and
practical. It arises for human beings because we are reflective creatures—we are creatures capable of asking “why?” On
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Korsgaard’s view, if we can identify some reply about which
it would be incoherent to raise this question, we have found a
satisfactory answer to the Normative Problem.
It is important to note here that in many ways a search for
a solution to The Normative Problem is an attempt to avoid
nihilism or meaninglessness. If we can’t fundamentally justify
the things that we care about, maybe they don’t matter after
all. In the case of morality, we might be left with moral skepticism or even moral nihilism. We’re looking for a solution that
somehow justifies our goals and projects. We’ll see however,
that the question is posed for rational creatures, and the answer
offered by Korsgaard is an answer that, if successful, provides
humans (or other rational creatures) with normatively grounded reasons for action.
Taking an attitude toward one’s own mental states is key to
answering The Normative Question for Korsgaard. Specifically, she focuses on what we’ll call reflective endorsement. Reflective endorsement involves (1) introspection, and (2), taking
an evaluative position toward the inner states upon which one
introspects. Endorsement in particular involves affirmation of
and identification with what one finds upon introspection.
Korsgaard identifies the correct deliberative procedure for
action in terms of conforming to what she calls our “practical identities.” One’s practical identity is “a description under
which you value yourself, a description under which you find
your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking” (Korsgaard 1996, 101). To act in accordance with a
practical identity is to reflectively endorse reasons for action
based upon some specific conception of ourselves. Most of
these identities are contingent. For example, a person might
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conceive of herself as a mother, a daughter, a member of a profession, or a citizen of a state. Some identities are more central
to our lives than others. The demands these practical identities
make on us take priority over others that are less fundamental
to who we are. All of our practical identities serve to ground
normative claims. As Korsgaard argues, “Your reasons for acting express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring
from what that identity forbids” (Korsgaard 1996, 101).
For Korsgaard, however, we have one practical identity that
is not contingent, namely, our ‘humanity’. Humanity is, as she
defines it, our “identity simply as a human being, a reflective
animal who needs reasons to act and to live” (Korsgaard 1996,
121). As she later explains, we are ‘human beings’ insofar as we
“need to have practical conceptions of [our] identity in order to
act or to live,” where this most fundamental identity “stands
behind” all the other particular identities we might have (Korsgaard 1996, 129). Because of its special status, Korsgaard concludes that we must value our own humanity—as well as the
humanity of everybody else—unconditionally. This gives rise
to moral obligations. It means that I, as a rational creature have
obligations to you, as another rational creature. In light of our
shared status as rational creatures, you have obligations to me
as well.

Practical Identities and Non-Human Animals
Where does this leave non-human animals? We are left with
the conclusion that non-human animals don’t act on the basis of
reasons, or, at the very least, not on reasons that are genuinely
normatively binding for them. If non-human animals aren’t capable of endorsing identities as, for example, parents or members of communities, there is no genuinely normative reason for
them to act as those roles dictate. In this way, on Korsgaard’s
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view, animals seem to be different from human beings, not just
in degree, but in kind. Humans are the kinds of things that act
for reasons and non-human animals are not.
I want to explore the plausibility of the idea that what it is to
take on a practical identity is to reflectively endorse a certain
conception of oneself. Consider the following example. Mark
thinks of himself as a writer. All of his life, he has found the
aesthetic of being a writer very attractive. He envisions himself someday hiding away in a cabin in the mountains, putting
the finishing touches on his novel like a character in a Stephen
King story. Mark has read books written by successful authors
providing tips and tricks of the craft. All the same, Mark hasn’t
put a word down on paper since college—he never writes anything. Imagine further that when Mark has free time, he engages in woodworking. At first, he just poked at it, his wife
wanted a new shelf for the living room, and he thought they’d
save money if he made it himself. As time progressed however, Mark increasingly spent more and more of his time on the
weekends in his garage at his workbench. When Mark reflects
on himself, when he attempts to know himself, he endorses a
conception of himself according to which he is a writer. The
idea that he is a woodworker never occurs to him. Which, if
either of these activities should we think of as one of Mark’s
“practical identities”?
It may be that “practical identity” is a technical term; by
stipulation it refers to the conception of oneself that one endorses upon reflection. If that is the case, it remains to be seen
whether these ways of conceiving of oneself are valuable. After
all, what does Mark gain by deluding himself into thinking that
he is a writer? What is philosophically interesting about this
identity constructed out of a misrepresentation of the facts? If,
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on the other hand, practical identities could be better understood as being revealed by what we do, then perhaps non-human animals have practical identities after all—identities that
give them genuinely normative reasons for action.
Non-human animals can and do take on roles in their communities, even if they cannot endorse those roles through a process of introspection on their values. Many animals are very
social and being social involves standing in certain kinds of
relations to others and serving certain kinds of functions. Consider the case of elephants. Elephants are very social beings
that live their lives in complex communities. The matriarchs
of elephant families are treated as leaders, though whether they
are followed or not might depend on factors like personality
and vitality. Elephants engage in cooperative behavior. Doing
so requires each elephant to understand their respective role,
even if they can’t articulate that role or endorse it from a second
order perspective. One way of thinking about practical identities is in terms of the set of things a being reliably and consistently does rather than how that being is inclined to identify. If
this is the case, then at least certain animals take on identities
that correspond to the roles that they play in their communities.
In the case of Mark the would-be writer (or Mark the covert
woodworker), I’ve described a person who isn’t entirely transparent to himself upon introspection. Knowing oneself can
be tricky. There are other cases of bungled introspection that
might be greater causes for concern. These involve instances
of Sartrean “bad faith.” Consider the case of Janet. Over the
years working her way up the corporate ladder, Janet has become a vicious businesswoman. She’s quick to take advantage of any opportunity, even if (and, perhaps, especially if)
doing so would put someone else at a significant disadvantage.
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When Janet introspects, she sees those tendencies there, they
are transparent to her. Nevertheless, such motivations strike
her as alien impulses. She does not endorse them, she does
not view them as arising from her enduring character. They
disgust her. Instead, when she introspects, she endorses a conception of herself according to which she is deeply committed
to loving her neighbor as herself. If she ever acts ruthlessly,
it is not really her, she is succumbing to alien impulses that
don’t reflect her true character. And she succumbs all the time.
Janet is either lying to herself, cherry picking, or both. In theory, it is possible for every identity that a person endorses upon
introspection to be formed in bad faith in this way. It may be
that these fabricated identities based on wishful thinking about
one’s true nature provide agents with normatively grounded
reasons for action. They have reasons to do what their idealized picture of themselves would do. This leaves the motivation for what they actually do utterly mysterious.
Human beings can weave narratives about their own lives.
They can tell themselves stories about who they are. This is an
interesting fact about human beings. It has the potential to be
profoundly beautiful, deeply disturbing, and maybe a little of
both. However, this fact about human beings does not entail
that human beings are different in kind from non-human animals or that human reasons are fundamentally different from
the reasons that motivate animals.
I’ve argued that it is possible for people to reflectively endorse conceptions of themselves in ways that either involve
self-deception or failing to see oneself clearly. So far, I have
only demonstrated that this is possible, I haven’t established
that it is likely. In the final section of this paper, I’ll provide
some reasons for thinking that human beings frequently en-
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dorse conceptions of themselves in ways that are less than ideal
from a philosophical standpoint. Before I do that, however, I
want to discuss a related view offered by Harry Frankfurt.

Frankfurt on Human Caring and Love
Harry Frankfurt uses the concept of reflective endorsement
in his account of what it is to be a person and his account of
personhood is directly related to his compatibilist view of free
will. He notes that human beings are capable of having both
first and second order beliefs and desires. For example, a being may have a first order desire to smoke a cigarette. In many
cases, a being’s second order desire may not ever be operative—that being might, on most occasions, smoke a cigarette
because they have a first order desire to smoke the cigarette.
On other occasions, however, a being might have second order
beliefs and desires about their first order desires. For example,
a being could have the following meta belief-desire pair, “I am
perfectly comfortable with my desire to smoke a cigarette, and
I want that desire to continue to be operative.” In this case,
the being will continue to smoke the cigarette. A being may
also have a second order belief-desire pair that conflicts with
the first order desire. For instance, the being might have the
second order belief-desire pair that can be expressed as a belief
that smoking is dangerous paired with a desire to stop smoking. In those cases in which the first order desire overwhelms
the second order desire (in this case, when the being smokes
the cigarette even when they don’t want to), the being exhibits
weakness of will. When the second order desire (sometimes in
this case referred to as a second order volition) steers the ship
and motivates the being to do its bidding, the being involved
exhibits both free will and personhood. The ability to guide
one’s first order desires through the use of one’s second order
desires is what makes a being a free person.
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The formulation of second order volitions requires introspection. In order to act, we must take our goals and projects
seriously. We must take ourselves seriously. Frankfurt says,
Taking ourselves seriously means that we are not prepared to accept ourselves just as we come. We want our
thoughts, our feelings, our choices, and our behavior to
make sense. We are not satisfied to think that our ideas
are formed haphazardly, or that our actions are driven
by transient and opaque impulses or by mindless decisions. We need to direct ourselves—or at any rate to
believe that we are directing ourselves—in thoughtful
conformity to stable and appropriate norms. We want
to get things right (Frankfurt 2006).
To determine whether we are getting things right will involve identification with our own beliefs and desires. When
we consider whether we ought to perform an action, we have
to test the commitments that action entails against other things
that we care about. This involves taking an evaluative stance
toward our attitudes. In making this point, Frankfurt identifies
what he takes to be a unique quality of members of our species.
He says,
We are unique (probably) in being able simultaneously
to be engaged in whatever is going on in our conscious
minds, to detach ourselves from it, and to observe it—
as it were—from a distance. We are then in a position
to form reflexive or higher order responses to it. For
instance, we may approve of what we notice ourselves
feeling, or we may disapprove; we may want to remain
the sort of person we observe ourselves to be, or we
may want to be different” (Frankfurt 2006).
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How do we determine what kind of person we want to be?
It depends on what we care about. Care and love are critical to
Frankfurt’s position—he takes them to be key to motivation.
What is it to care? Frankfurt emphasizes that there is a difference between merely wanting or desiring a thing and caring
about that thing. An addict may want a drug, but it does not
follow that he or she cares about the drug (though, of course,
some addicts might). Caring about things is a matter of endorsing or identifying with them and is a position that we arrive at
through introspection and reflection. Caring also has a temporal component. He says, “when we do care about something,
we go beyond wanting it. We want to go on wanting it, at least
until the goal has been reached. Thus, we feel it as a lapse on
our part if we neglect the desire, and we are disposed to take
steps to refresh the desire if it should tend to fade” (Frankfurt
2006). The caring entails, in other words, an ongoing commitment to the object of care. He says, “By our caring, we maintain various thematic continuities in our volitions” (Frankfurt
2006). Though all instances of caring involve second order
volitions, the converse is not true. Not all second order volitions represent instances of caring because of the temporal
component involved in caring. He says, “Caring about something implies a diachronic coherence, which integrates itself
throughout time.” I’ll call this general requirement Frankfurt’s
Re-affirmational Requirement for Caring.
Re-Affirmational Requirement for Caring: If we care
about something, we are “disposed [through time] to
take steps to refresh the desire should it tend to fade.”
Frankfurt also identifies a third category of evaluative attitude—there are some things that we come to love. When we
love things, we often have very little, or no control at all, over
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whether we love them. The things that we love and that we
can’t help but to care about are what Frankfurt calls “volitional
necessities.” He says, “The objects of our love represent our
most fundamental commitments and provide us with overriding reasons for action. When we love something, we see it as
having value in itself, and we see the interests of the thing or
the person that we love as worthy of pursuit for their own sake”
(Frankfurt 2006, 229).
Like Korsgaard, Frankfurt identifies the source of our most
compelling set of obligations as the set of things that we would
die rather than to give up. For him, these things are volitional
necessities. The things that we love provide us with our most
compelling reasons for action, followed by the reasons that are
provided by the things that we care about. Like Korsgaard,
then, Frankfurt thinks that what explains the value of the things
that we care about is the very fact that we value them, where
valuing is a process that requires introspection.

Love, Care, and Non-Human Animals
Unless we want to deny the available behavioral evidence,
we ought to believe that non-human animals experience and
engage in both love and care. When the mother of a non-human
animal protects and provides for her young even when doing so
puts her to great hardship or even risks her life, it appears that
she does so because she cares about her young. Indeed, it is
hard to imagine what evidence to the contrary could even look
like. After all, the best evidence we can attain for the conclusion that one human being cares for another is the way they
treat that other. There is really nothing left to check.
If we accept Frankfurt’s view, however, we are again left with
the conclusion that human love and human care differ from love
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and care experienced and practiced by non-human animals not
just in degree but in kind. Human care requires the capacity to
introspect—to take attitudes toward one’s own thoughts. Since
at least some non-human animals can’t introspect, love and care
are totally different kinds of phenomena for them. Given that
all beings evolved under similar conditions, the idea that these
very similar behaviors are, at their core, fundamentally different strikes me as a claim that is implausible on its face. Setting
that concern aside, I’ll raise some objections to Frankfurt’s account of caring. Throughout, I will again suggest that caring
might be better understood as a disposition to behave rather
than as an introspective activity.
Frankfurt’s re-affirmational account of caring requires a being to understand itself as persisting through time. That being
must care, and they must want to want to go on caring. This
leaves many non-human animals out of the caring business, at
least when it comes to caring of this form. I’ll argue that this is
an implausible requirement in the case of human beings as well.
One reason it is implausible is because it assumes that a person
is always aware of what they care about. Consider Jane Austin’s
Emma. It is clear to all readers from the very outset of the novel
that Emma cares for Mr. Knightly. Emma herself professes her
intentions to never marry and she seems to be oblivious to her
own affections. Nevertheless, all of her actions throughout the
novel support the idea that she cares for Mr. Knightly and at the
end of the novel the surprise ending is a surprise only to Emma
herself! There are, of course, non-fictional examples of this
kind of phenomenon. Children may claim to care little for what
their parents think of them, yet spend their entire lives seeking
the approval of those very parents. They may be genuinely unaware that they care or of the extent to which they care.
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Frankfurt’s account also suggests that caring is not caring
unless it persists through time and is introspectively re-affirmed repeatedly. Metaphysically, that requirement seems to
transform all short-term cares into mere “wants.” I think this
is implausible. Consider the following case. A set of expecting
parents eagerly awaits the birth of their first child. The pregnancy goes well, and there is no reason to believe anything is
amiss. When the child is delivered, it is clear that something is
horribly wrong. For seconds, the parents care desperately about
the health of the child—they care more than anything else in
the world about the continued life of their baby. Within moments, it is clear that the care, at least in that particular form,
no longer makes sense. The child is dead. The parents can’t
carry forth that particular care into the future, they can’t reflectively re-affirm it. Yet it seems that the phenomenon of care
was instantiated in the intensity of that particular emotion in
that particular moment.
If the two examples I have provided are effective, they show
that we ought to be reluctant to accept Frankfurt’s account of
care. If Frankfurt has shown anything, he has shown that the
act of re-affirmational caring through introspection may be sufficient for caring but is not necessary. If this is the case, humans and non-human animals often, perhaps even most of the
time, care in the same ways.
We recognize care behavior when we see it. When a teacher
dedicates long hours to help a struggling student, we recognize
care, even if the teacher never affirms the attitude or tells us
how she feels. When an adult child diligently sees to the needs
of their aging and infirm parent, we recognize care. When
members of animal social groups go out of the way to be there
for one another, we recognize care. In Ethics and Animals, Lori
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Gruen describes a relationship between two elephants, Shirley
and Jenny, who were held together under tragic confinement
conditions at a circus (Gruen 2011). Early in their lives, they
were separated. They were reunited in later life at an elephant
sanctuary, and immediately bonded to one another, demonstrating strong signs that they remembered one another. Gruen
describes the end of Jenny’s life in the following way,
Shirley and Jenny, though separated for twenty years,
were now inseparable at the sanctuary, even through
Jenny’s very last days. Jenny, though much younger
than Shirley, came to the sanctuary in 1996 in very
ill health. Jenny recovered enough to enjoy each day
of her remaining ten years at the sanctuary, but the
physical toll of her early life was inescapable. During the last week of Jenny’s life, in October of 2006,
Shirley was at her side, helping her to get up when she
could. When it was clear that Jenny’s life was coming
to an end, Shirley walked off into the woods and stayed
there. She didn’t eat for two days. Shirley had bonded
with other elephants, and they helped her heal (Gruen
2011, 131).
Shirley may not be able to take attitudes toward her own
mental states. She does not consciously re-affirm her commitment to Jenny’s well-being to see to it that the care continues
to thrive. Nevertheless, one of her identities is friend to Jenny,
and she demonstrates her care and commitment through her
reliable dispositions to behave in caring ways.

Reflective Endorsement and “Knowing Oneself”
Earlier I asked you to keep in mind an agent, Jane, who always
forms beliefs on the basis of the best available evidence, and who
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consistently introspectively keeps her beliefs and values in alignment. People like Jane do not exist. Jane is an idealized version
of a human person. This matters when we are thinking about the
differences between human animals and non-human animals.
For reflective endorsement to play the kind of role in philosophical theories that Korsgaard and Frankfurt have in mind, it
must be the case that agents engage in the reflective process in
good faith. There is something very appealing about Jane. She
is living the examined life. We like to imagine that all people
are or can be like Jane. In what follows I will provide some research in empirical social psychology that suggests that reflective endorsement has some value, but not the value captured
by our description of Jane. We tend to reflect and endorse in
ways that keep us psychologically healthy, even if those endorsements don’t match the facts. Reflective endorsement may
be good for mental health but bad for authenticity. I’ll provide
two general types of examples below.

The Self-Serving Bias
Studies support the conclusion that we are motivated to both
attain and to maintain a positive sense of self. The process of
reflective endorsement can help us to develop a positive conception of ourselves that is psychologically healthy.
It is a truism that most people are average. After all, that’s
what it is to be average. Despite the obvious truth of this description, however, most people believe of themselves that they
are above average. In a paper on the topic, Alicke and Govorun
highlight the results of a well-documented case of the phenomenon:
Data collected in conjunction with the 1976 College
Board Exams provide one of the earliest, most strik-
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ing, and most frequently cited demonstrations of the
better-than-average effect. Of the approximately one
million students who took the SAT that year, 70%
placed themselves above the median in leadership ability, 60% above the median in athletic ability, and 85%
rated themselves above the median in their ability to
get along well with others (Alicke and Govorun 2005).
It is obvious that many of the participants were wrong about
how they compared to the average with respect to each of these
characteristics. What this study and many others like it highlight is that we have a psychological need to think highly of
our good traits—in many cases, more highly than appraisal of
our traits honestly deserves. It seems that we do this, in part,
because thinking highly of ourselves is an important part of
psychological health.
Importantly for our purposes here, people also have a tendency to view themselves as better moral agents than their
peers. Codol asked study participants to assess how often they
conformed to socially desirable norms (Codol 1975). Most participants indicated that they conformed to such norms more often than average.
As a result of the better-than-average phenomenon, or our
self-serving bias, we are inclined to view ourselves in more
favorable ways than might actually be warranted by the best
available evidence. Viewing ourselves in the best possible
light, or, at least, in a better-than average light, contributes to
psychological health. Reflective endorsement can, and probably
often does, contribute to this conception of ourselves. We introspect, we consider ourselves and our traits, and we employ a
heuristic that emphasizes the positive.
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Self-Verification
Reflective endorsement can also be psychologically healthy
in another way—to satisfy a need we have to verify those
components of the self that we already take ourselves to have.
Some social scientists have suggested that, in addition to satisfying a need for predictability and control, our impulse to
self-verify also satisfies a psychological need that we have to
have “consistent and balanced cognitions” (Moskowitz 2005).
Too much change is unsettling to us. Therefore, in addition to
attempting to maintain a positive view of ourselves, we also try
to maintain a stable one.
In support of the claim that human beings have a tendency
toward self-verification that is distinct from their tendency toward self-serving affirmations, studies have been conducted
that indicate that human beings prefer to be judged negatively
with respect to those features of their lives or behavior that they
already view as being deficient. In one such study, participants
were asked to describe their worst feature (e.g., their weight)
(Jr. 1990). Other participants were then brought in to comment
on that feature. Some of these participants said something
positive about the feature and others said something negative
about the feature. The original participants were then asked
which of the two assessors they would like to participate with
in a later stage of the experiment, and people chose the assessor who agreed with their assessment of their negative feature
rather than the one who disagreed with it. It may be, then, that,
to achieve a sense of consistency, we accept evidence from
others that supports the ways in which we already want to view
ourselves, and that we reject disconfirming evidence.
The process of reflection on one’s own attributes followed
by disavowing one or more of them is a paradigm case of en-
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gaging in a reflective endorsement process (or, in this case, an
instance of reflective disavowal). These studies suggest that we
like confirmation of the ways in which we are already inclined
to view ourselves.
Reflective endorsement is a useful mechanism for achieving mental health and stability. To that extent, it is valuable.
That said, these examples undercut the idea that endorsement
is a way of constructing normatively binding reasons for action
and undermine the idea that introspection reveals to us what
we really care about. It seems that one of the main functions
of reflective endorsement is to prevent us from plunging into
existential crisis caused by psychologically distressing or disorienting discoveries about ourselves.

Conclusion
According to many philosophers, the ability to reflect on
one’s own inner states and to take an evaluative attitude toward
what one finds is an ability that sets human beings apart from
non-human animals. In this paper, I have argued that endorsement does not serve the philosophical functions often attributed to it. If this is correct, then species membership may make
little difference when it comes to motivation, reasons, caring,
and love. People reveal who they are and what they care about
through their reliable behavior. In this way, we are not different in kind from non-human animals who also demonstrate
commitment and care through their dispositions to behave in
caring ways.
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